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ABSTRACT

This article aims to explore and compare the actions of the Brazilian government concerning the commitments made under the Paris Agreement, focusing on declarations and protocols agreed upon for reducing GHG emissions and the Nationally Determined Contribution. The Federal Government, through the Ministry of the Environment, directs efforts to reduce deforestation in the Amazon rainforest and projects to eliminate it by 2030. However, the delay rhetoric becomes evident when this same government politically acts to allow environmental licensing for oil exploration in the Foz do Amazonas Basin (Block FZA-M-59), one of the most vulnerable regions in the coastal zone of Brazil. Two experiences in the Amazon are revisited, the Yasuní-ITT Initiative and the PPG7, to propose an Amazon Climate Initiative built with the leadership of society and based on the principles of environmental and climate justice.

Keywords: Environmental and Climate Justice; Oil and Gas Exploration; Amazon River Basin; Yasuní-ITT; PPG7; Amazon Climate Initiative.

RESUMO

Este artigo se propõe a prospectar e confrontar ações do governo brasileiro em relação aos compromissos firmados pelo Acordo de Paris, com ênfase em declarações e protocolos pactuados para a redução de emissões de GEE e na Contribuição Nacionalmente Determinada. O Governo Federal, através do Ministério do Meio Ambiente, direciona esforços para a redução do desmatamento da floresta amazônica e projeta zerá-lo até 2030. Entretanto, o discurso do atraso se verifica quando, este mesmo governo, atua politicamente para liberar o licenciamento ambiental para exploração de petróleo na Bacia da Foz do Amazonas (Bloco FZA-M-59), numa das regiões mais vulneráveis da zona costeira brasileira. São revisitadas duas experiências na Amazônia: a Iniciativa Yasuní-ITT e o PPG7, para propor uma Iniciativa Amazônica pelo Clima, construída com o protagonismo da sociedade e fundamentada em princípios de justiça ambiental e climática.

Palavras-chave: Justiça Ambiental e Climática; Exploração de Petróleo e Gás; Bacia da Foz do Amazonas; Yasuní-ITT; PPG7; Inciativa Amazônica pelo Clima.

INTRODUCTION

This article presents a brief contextualization of the ongoing environmental licensing process for oil and gas exploration on the Brazilian Equatorial Margin, specifically Block FZA-M-59, located in the Foz do Amazonas Basin, in deep waters (offshore) off the northern coast of Amapá, bordering French Guiana. Based on this case study and theoretical perspectives aligned with political ecology, the article discusses the contradictions evident in recent environmental and climate protocols.

The binding climate protocols, from the Paris Agreement to COP28 (Dubai), agreed to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The Brazilian government's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) is aligned to meet the goal of zero deforestation of the Amazon Rainforest by 2030 but is not aligned regarding the possible exploration of oil in the Foz do Amazonas Basin, one of the most vulnerable regions of the northern Brazilian coast.

Given the contradictions of the Brazilian government concerning the national commitments assumed for the climate and possible approval of the environmental license for oil and gas exploration in the Foz do Amazonas Basin, the experiences of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative and the Pilot Program to Protect the Brazilian Rain Forests (PPG7) are revisited as instructive and collaborative pedagogies to inspire the construction of an Amazon Climate Initiative (in Portuguese, IAC).

In methodological terms, this article presents the results of an investigation into the contradictions between regional development policies and commitments to environmental and climate protocols, with special attention to the Brazilian Amazon, based on a literature review, documentary research, and statistical and cartographic survey. The research (and the resulting article) falls within the area of Urban and Regional Planning more than any other field of knowledge, especially on regional development studies.

The text has five main sections to present the results and achieve the purposes underlying this article: following this introduction (first section), the environmental licensing for oil and gas exploration on the Brazilian equatorial margin is discussed (second section), the steps taken by Brazil — that is, by its authorities — between the Paris Agreement in 2015 and COP28 in 2023 are reviewed (third section), the experiences of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative and the PPG7 and their respective lessons for a possible Amazon Climate Initiative are revisited (fourth section) and, finally, the final considerations (fifth section).

ENVIRONMENTAL LICENSING FOR OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION IN THE AMAZON RIVER BASIN

The oil and gas exploration phase begins with signing a research contract. In this phase, studies are conducted to detect the presence of oil and/or gas in the area under contract, called "Block." If this stage is successful, companies move on to the next phase of the contract, when production begins, and the contracted area becomes known as the "Field" (ANP, 2023).

Given the scarcity of mature fields, the necessity to expand oil and gas reserves to guarantee production led the Brazilian National Oil, Gas and Biofuels Agency (ANP) to reactivate old exploration projects in Brazilian sedimentary basins, including the Foz do Amazonas Basin, one of the five basins in the Brazilian Equatorial Margin (Figure 1).

Figure 1 | Foz do Amazonas Basin

Source: Rodolfo Almeida/SAMAÚMA (Antunes, 2023).

In 2013, the ANP promoted the 11th round of bidding for blocks for exploration and production of oil and natural gas. Block FZA-M-57, located on the coast of Amapá, received the highest bonus of the round, in the order of 345 million reais. The consortium, led by the French company Total, obtained the concession for the Block as an operator, with a 40% stake, with the British company British Petroleum (30%) and the Brazilian company Petrobras (30%) as consortium members.

The explanations for the high bonus paid for the exploratory block (FZA-M-57) can be summarized as follows: a) analogies of geological structures and discoveries of oil and gas in Guiana and West Africa; b) technological evolution of offshore oil and gas exploration/production; c) predominance of the upstream sector of ultra-deepwater projects; and d) projected increase in global demand for oil. The latter refers to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) projection of a 23% increase in global primary energy demand by 2045, with stronger incremental demand for wind and solar, but still maintaining the largest share of oil and gas in the global energy matrix, at 54% (OPEC, 2023).

The success of the bidding for blocks in the Foz do Amazonas Basin raised expectations for possible opportunities for oil and gas production in Amapá, including a) *royalties*, b) incentives for the production chain and the training of local labor, and c) generation of employment and income. However, exploration has not yet taken place due to the denial of the environmental license by the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) and the complexity involved in a high-risk activity with potentially significant environmental impacts.

Also in 2014, three environmental licensing processes for offshore drilling activities in the Foz do Amazonas Basin were filed with IBAMA, accompanied by Environmental Impact Studies and Reports (EIAs/RIMAs) (Table 1):

Table 1 | Environmental licensing processes in the Foz do Amazonas Basin filed with IBAMA in 2014

IBAMA Process	Interested Company	Activity	Current Situation
02022.000327/2014-62	Total E&P do Brasil	Offshore drilling in FZA-M-57 Blocks 86, 88, 125 and 127	Closed
02022.000336/2014-53	BP Energy do Brasil	Offshore drilling in Block FZA-M-59	Under analysis under recommendation from Petrobrás
02022.000336/2014-07	Queiroz Galvão Perfuração e Produção S.A.	Offshore drilling in Block FZA-M-90	Closed

Source: IBAMA (2015).

Oil and gas exploration in the Foz do Amazonas Basin has become the center of debate on regional development, with greater intensity in the states of Amapá and Pará. IBAMA maintains its denial of the environmental license, with technical opinions linked to the licensing process, which refer to the Precautionary Principle, due to the uncertainties of possible oil spills, considering that the region is extremely environmentally fragile. The absence of a Sedimentary Area Environmental Assessment (AAAS, in Portuguese) and environmental management instruments to prevent potentially significant impacts makes decision-making difficult, considering that this area has a notable socio-environmental sensitivity (IBAMA, 2023).

The reactions, initially emblematic in the face of the predominance of the developmental model, result from a consensus between political representatives, the company (Petrobrás), and the public with diffuse interests, all disagreeing with IBAMA's refusal. In dissent are environmental protection entities, such as the Brazilian Association of Members of the Public Ministry for the Environment (ABRAMPA), which issued a statement in support of IBAMA, and Indigenous organizations in Oiapoque, which demand prior consultation considering local perceptions of climate change:

> [...] the inhabitants of the Oiapoque Indigenous Lands have been noticing changes in the rhythms of nature, in the rain cycle, and in environmental dynamics that can be observed throughout the seasons, with winter being the rainy season and summer being the dry season (IEPÉ, 2023, p. 8).

Fishers, riverside dwellers, and quilombolas have also spoken about their perception of climate change's impacts on their territories and ways of life (Gomes, Calado; 2022, Greenpeace, 2024). Greater attention given to these social groups would allow for increased visibility of the impacts, including the universities in the Amazon region, which are late to join the climate debate.

The politicians in the region, mainly from the states of Amapá and Pará and within the federal government structure itself, led by Petrobras (except for the Ministry of the Environment, which maintains the position that environmental licensing is a technical procedure), intensified the mobilization for the issuance of the environmental license by IBAMA.

The explorations in neighboring basins in Guyana and Suriname also pressure the inflection point in favor of environmental licensing. The more than 15 billion barrels of proven reserves in Guyana and Suriname fuel the possible confirmation of oil and gas reserves in the blocks at the Foz do Amazonas Basin (Campos Jr., 2023).

The most recent movement in the environmental licensing process for prospecting Block FZA-M-59, on the coast of Amapá, during the writing of this article (August 2024), concerns the request for reconsideration filed by Petrobrás at IBAMA and the recommendation of the Federal Public Ministry regarding the maintenance of the rejection issued by IBAMA in May 2023.

The case of possible oil and gas exploration in the Foz do Amazonas Basin, without losing sight of the importance of participatory action research in Amapá, instigates critical thinking towards an effort to analyze the situation and interdisciplinary perspectives based on experiences of the "place." Escobar (2005, p. 77, our translation) suggests "distinguishing between those forms of globalization of the local that become effective political forces in defense of place and place-based identities, as well as those forms of localization of the global that locals can use to their advantage."

The implications of the perspective of place are present in studies by Soler (2009) on onshore oil production in Coari, in the state of Amazonas, which highlights intense migration and false expectations of job creation, and by Viglio, Di Giulio, and Ferreira (2017) on the uncertainties due to the limitations of the environmental licensing protocols of the Pre-Salt, in the state of Rio de Janeiro. In the script for the globalization of the place, Martinez Alier (2007) points out environmental injustices and distributive conflicts in mineral extraction projects, and Ross (2015) highlights the risks to democracy, patriarchy, and violence in oil and gas-producing regions.

FROM THE PARIS AGREEMENT TO COP 28

NDCs[1] formalize the goals of countries that ratified the Paris Agreement in 2015. These goals must be reviewed every five years and always linked to the principles of the constitutional right to an ecologically balanced environment. At COP21, the NDCs were considered insufficient to meet the Paris Agreement's goal of limiting the increase in global average temperature to below 2°C, considering pre-industrial levels, and focusing efforts on limiting the temperature increase to 1.5°C (IPCC, 2018).

The first review of Brazil's NDC occurred at the end of 2020. Dubbed "Climate Pedaling," the review did not present absolute data on the reduction in emissions intended by Brazil, maintaining the same 2015 targets of reducing emissions by 43% in 2030 compared to 2005, in addition to an intention to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, ten years later than announced by most countries, except China.

A second review occurred in 2022, with Brazil committing to reducing GHG emissions by 37% in 2025 (in the year of COP30) and by 50% in 2030, using 2005 levels as a reference. Brazil's revised NDC brings forward the indicative long-term goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050.

The third review (from 2023) and the current Brazilian NDC establishes that the country must reduce its emissions by 48% by 2025 and 53% by 2030 in relation to 2005 emissions. The Brazilian Government reiterated its long-term goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050.

The burning of fossil fuels accounts for 75.6% of global CO_2 emissions (Ge; Friedrich; Vigna, 2020). In the case of Brazil, the main sources of emissions are deforestation and agriculture (land use), with energy occupying third place. Reducing emissions from deforestation is essential to keep global warming below 1.5°C. Brazil has committed to zero deforestation of the Amazon rainforest by 2030 (MMA, 2023; 2024), a goal ratified in the Belém Declaration (OTCA, 2023). In 2025, COP30 will serve as a kind of mid-term review of the zero-deforestation target but will also allow for setting the tone for discourses.

In 2023, at COP28 in Dubai, the transition away from fossil fuels was approved — *transitioning away*. There are expectations about how this process will take place in Brazil, with criticism of the absence of a national transition strategy towards the end of fossil fuels and public statements contradictory to the

1 The Paris Agreement is a global treaty adopted in December 2015 by the signatory countries of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) during the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21). In this agreement, governments committed to act to keep the increase in the global average temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to make efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C. Each signatory country has established GHG emission reduction targets, called Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC).

maintenance of oil exploration in government plans (Toni, 2024).

At COP28, Colombia signed the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty, but Brazil announced it would join the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Plus (OPEC+), strengthening the role of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as a source of fossil energy.

Another "unresolved" issue on the global climate agenda, which countries pushed back to COP29 and will possibly return to the agenda at COP30, concerns who will pay the bill for the energy transition:

> The COP28 outcome punted most finance issues to COP29, with the adoption of a new climate finance goal — called the New Collective Qualitative Goal (NCQG) — being the big-ticket item for next year. This new goal will replace developed countries' current commitment of providing $100 billion annually in climate finance to developing nations, first agreed to in 2009. The new goal will need to take into account developing countries' needs and priorities, estimated at $5.8 trillion - $5.9 trillion up until 2030 (Waskow *et al.*, 2023).

The financial benefits for those who protect forests will be an essential discussion at COP30. It is worth remembering that protected areas or conservation units, together with the Indigenous territories of the Brazilian Amazon, hold 58% of the total carbon stock in the Amazon and are responsible for a significant proportion of the carbon sequestration throughout the region (Nobre, 2020).

The topic of "climate change" is highly complex, requiring more accessible pedagogies for the population to understand. Some concepts are still distant from society, as shown in the publication of the non-governmental organization FASE Solidariedade e Educação about the term "net zero": "[...] this is a concept that is still little explained and discussed in Brazil by civil society movements and organizations" (Mello; Tura; Santos, 2023, our translation). COP30 will take place in Belém, in the state of Pará, 10 years after the Paris Agreement, and will be an opportunity to make climate change a more democratic and inclusive issue.

As important as climate pedagogy is reflecting on proposals that can articulate global-local initiatives. To this end, it was decided to rescue the Yasuní-ITT Initiative and the PPG7, which are connected in terms of learning for possible global climate governance and achieving Brazil's emissions reduction targets.

YASUNÍ-ITT INITIATIVE AND PPG7

The experiences of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative and the PPG7 allow us to revisit some lessons that should guide climate change policies in development, both at the national and regional/local scale. The Yasuní-ITT Amazon Initiative, cited here as one of the boldest climate transition experiences, places developed CO_2-emitting countries at the forefront of responsibility for climate change and environmental justice (Kothari *et al.*, 2021). The Pilot Program to Protect the Brazilian Rain Forests (PPG7) has become known as the largest cooperation program on the planet, aimed to construct and implement a participatory and integrated agenda for environmental management in the Amazon.

THE YASUNÍ-ITT INITIATIVE

The Yasuní-ITT Initiative became known worldwide in 2007, when the Ecuadorian government announced at the United Nations General Assembly the country's commitment to renounce oil exploration in the Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) block within the Yasuní National Park, one of the most intact and biodiverse areas in the Amazon. As (partial) compensation, rich countries were called upon to form a compensatory fund for non-exploitation, justified by the non-emission of GHGs, the preservation of biodiversity, and the protection of the rights of Indigenous people.

In 2013, Rafael Correa, the president of Ecuador, declared the termination of the initiative and blamed the international community for the lack of progress in raising compensatory funds. Since then, studies on the Yasuní-ITT Initiative have shown the experience was innovative and bold but also full of tensions and conflicts (Espinosa, 2013; Laastad, 2024; Lamb *et al*., 2020; Pellegrini *et al*., 2014).

The Yasuní-ITT Initiative proposal produced the following confluences:

a. Origins in social movements, with broad support from Indigenous populations, one of the most active political forces in Ecuador and historically most combative against oil production in their territories and defenders of Good Living,

b. Presence of organic intellectuals who became part of the government of Rafael Correa, among them Alberto Acosta, who served as President of the Constituent Assembly and Minister of Energy and Mines, being the main creator of the oil moratorium due to his criticism of dependence on oil revenues or oil dependence,

c. Government climate pioneering for avoided CO_2 emissions,

d. Innovation of a post-extractive economic model, adhering to global governance for climate and biodiversity,

e. "Conservation and development" integration.

Analyses of the proposal point to lessons learned, motivating new financial donation contracts, focused on climate goals that can drive multilateral or bilateral agreements in compliance with the responsibilities of emitting countries. Examining experiences of oil moratoriums can provide crucial contributions on how to achieve realistic CO_2 phase-out targets, mitigate the "discourse of backwardness" of fossil fuel extraction, and establish a planetary environmental ethic.

"Discourses of climate delay" is an expression used by Lamb et al. (2020) to highlight impasses or discursive subterfuges created, often with the connotation of a transition that never arrives, insurmountable obstacles, or the right to pollute due to low emissions, to escape immediate responsibilities in decision-making regarding the impacts of climate change. These are speeches of a new climate denialism, less ideological and closer to political opportunism.

Espinosa (2013), when analyzing the speeches that surround the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, points out the difficulties in finding a safe and reliable institutional arrangement between the parties to manage international cooperation resources. Pellegrini *et al.* (2014) concluded that potential conflicts in the institutional environment were not adequately mediated or even non-existent, allowing the emergence of tensions surrounding a state dependent on oil finances or "petrostate." Laastad (2024) believes that such tensions occurred within the government but also between the government and the international scale, which has demonstrated fragile climate governance, a position shared by Acosta (2016, p. 213):

> Ecuador surprised the world in 2007 when it proposed leaving a significant volume of oil underground in the Yasuní National Park in the Amazon. This project, known as the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, which emerged within civil society, was unable to consolidate itself in official spheres due to the inconsistencies and contradictions of the Ecuadorian government. The insensitivity of the governments of the most powerful countries, which did not want to assume their responsibilities, also played a role (our translation).

In contrast to the discourse of financial compensation for not extracting oil, the right of nature can be invoked, as there is no relationship between the unmitigated impacts of the activity and what could justify compensation. Thus, the Ecuadorian government's decision to authorize oil exploration in the Yasuní National Park is criticized based on the discourse of job and income generation since "there is no direct relationship between large capital inflows from the exploration of mineral raw materials and poverty reduction" (Gudynas, 2019, p. 242, our translation).

The Yasuní-ITT Initiative instigates many lessons, and this section briefly revisited some of them. The reading made here aligns with the interpretation of Acosta and Brand (2018) regarding the perception that the Ecuadorian government initially welcomed the proposal of social movements by proposing a global climate governance strategy for the benefit of nature. However, the same Ecuadorian government was unable to resist the pressures of petroleum power and to politically assume a post-oil extraction economic transition in favor of Good Living.

The experience of the Ecuadorian Amazon connects, in many aspects and lessons learned, with another environmental management experience in the Amazon aimed at protecting the tropical forests of Brazil, the PPG7.

THE PPG7

The Pilot Program to Protect the Brazilian Rain Forests (PPG7) was conceived and implemented in the 1990s and can be considered the largest international cooperation program structuring environmental and sustainability policies, until then, implemented in the Amazon. Its objective was to reduce deforestation and promote sustainable practices in rural communities in the region, providing an experience of cooperation between Brazil, the Amazon states, and donor countries in favor of the standing forest and the climate.

PPG7 was composed of a set of 26 subprograms and projects organized into five main categories or lines of action:

1. Protection and management of Conservation Units and Indigenous Lands,
2. Experimentation and demonstration of sustainable production and resource management,
3. Institutional strengthening of state and municipal governments for integrated environmental management,
4. Support for applied research in science and technology,
5. Identification and dissemination of lessons learned.

The latter placed much more value on monitoring results than on monitoring processes, which implied a low impact on the transition from PPG7 to integrated environmental policies.

Kohlhepp (2018, p. 327, our translation) acknowledged the importance of this learning, arguing that "the lessons learned from the Pilot Program for the Amazon should not be forgotten, but should be much more considered in current projects for the protection of tropical ecosystems and the entire Brazilian environment." Regarding the post-PPG7 period, it is worth recalling Marina Silva's (current Minister of the Environment) point of view at the time:

> The accumulated experience of the Pilot Program has served as a basis for the Federal Government's public policies for the Amazon. The greatest milestone of these policies is the Sustainable Amazon Plan (PAS), which constitutes the framework for the continuation of the Pilot Program and will coordinate federal and state actions for an integrated development of the region (MMA, 2006, p. 44, our translation).

The PAS, launched by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2008, had a short life and ended up forgotten on the shelves of discontinuities in regional public policies, announced with a strong appeal for sustainable development. The PPG7 was much larger than the PAS and left an essential environmental legacy for the Amazon, in addition to the lessons we seek to recover here to propose the Amazon Climate Initiative (in Portuguese, IAC).

One of the main challenges of PPG7 was finding an administrative arrangement for its execution. The size of the financial resources involved, the ambition of its programs and goals, the multifaceted nature of government-society participation, the environmental federalism centralized in Brasília, the cultural gap between donor countries, and the realities of the Amazon

states are some of the inputs that consumed part of the Program's energy. This seems to be a dilemma that has not yet been resolved and is also present in the analyses of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative. However, the existence of an Amazon Coordination Secretariat within the structure of the Ministry of the Environment alleviated the management difficulties of the PPG7[2].

In its original conception, PPG7 failed to deepen the debate on the accelerated process of urbanization on the Amazon and its direct and indirect links with deforestation. This design lapse gave the Program a preservationist fingerprint, giving rise to the criticism (still current) regarding the neglect of the issue of Amazonian cities (Becker, 2013).

It can be said that PPG7 is responsible for the consolidation of environmental management in the Amazon. Investments from the PPG7/Natural Resources Policy Subprogram (in Portuguese, SPRN) allowed the structuring of State Environmental Agencies (in Portuguese, OEMAs) for the implementation of environmental policy instruments, with an emphasis on territorial planning produced by studies by state Ecological-Economic Zoning (in Portuguese, ZEE) teams. In some states, such as Amapá, the ZEE team has become a regional reference.

Unlike the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, which was born from social movements, the PPG7 continued as a program to support the strengthening of public environmental policies, with limited experiences that could favor environmental protagonism from civil society organizations, mainly community initiatives led by women, alternatives to the constraints of capitalism, colonialism, and patriarchy — which have sacrificed the region since its invention (Gondim, 1994; Chagas, 2022).

The systematization of some results of the PPG7, here "not forgotten," has the purpose of substantiating arguments in favor of the IAC, embodied in the environmental and climate justice stated in studies about the Yasuní-ITT Initiative.

2 At the time, there was an Amazon Coordination Secretariat (SCA) at the Ministry of Environment (MMA) that managed a set of actions in the region, with significant results in terms of advances in the decentralization of environmental management and local social participation. It is worth highlighting the Pilot Program to Protect the Brazilian Rain Forests (PPG7), with resources transferred to states and non-governmental organizations operating in the Amazon. In addition, the SCA articulated a set of projects that enhanced the results of the PPG7, such as the Amazon Protected Areas Program (ARPA) and the Amazon Ecotourism Development Program (PROECOTUR) (Chagas, 2003).

THE AMAZON CLIMATE INITIATIVE

The experiences of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative and the PPG7 converge towards a possible proposal for an Amazon Climate Initiative (IAC). The tributaries of this confluence are lessons highlighted by Kohlhepp (2018) and discussed by Acosta (2016) and Gudynas (2019), among others.

IAC is based on the premise of a new ethic for nature, anchored not in a proposal for an energy transition through climate but in the political decision that the point of no return of the Amazon rainforest is reversible only if it is based on a pluriverse of economic alternatives and ways of life, with very low environmental impact, in opposition to the capitalist logic of exploitation of nature (Kothari *et al*., 2021).

In this case, the possible exploration of oil and gas in the Foz do Amazonas Basin should be avoided not by claiming equivalent financial compensation but as an alternative to sacrificing nature. Alternatives like this are present in the principles of Good Living, in other teachings briefly stated in this text and strongly expressed by the Indigenous peoples of Oiapoque: "Our view of the territory is one of protection. It is not a look of ambition, of exploitation, as we often see in the vision of non-Indigenous people. For example, for us, the earth offers food, but also healing" (CCPIO, 2019, p. 21, our translation).

The Yasuní-ITT Initiative demonstrated that non-Indigenous people are hostages of petroleum power. Every capital-intensive project, subject to state control only through fragile environmental licensing and distant monitoring, such as the process of oil and gas exploration in the Foz do Amazonas Basin, coordinated by IBAMA in Rio de Janeiro, tends to reproduce forms of subordination and environmental and climate injustice.

In turn, PPG7 provided the first input for integrated environmental management in the Amazon, strengthening OEMAs and disseminating high-intensity community participation experiences. These experiences were dormant in the (re)formulation of regional public policies, as in the case of PAS, but also in some protocols of environmental policy instruments, despite public hearings and consultations to endorse government political decisions.

In this way, Amazonian states such as Amapá and Pará, which have preserved and protected nature but bear deep scars from extractive mining and oil projects, must lead an Amazon Climate Initiative with horizontal management anchored in principles of participatory and community democracy and nature-based solutions. The future is ancestral, or perhaps there is no future (Krenak, 2022).

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Climate protocols are limited to top-down actions by the Brazilian Federal Government, with little affirmative connection from the Amazon states, confirming the hypothesis that attention to climate change remains on a pedagogical level distant from Amazonian society, even in the face of tragic evidence of floods and droughts, food insecurity and deaths.

The possible exploration of oil and gas in the Foz do Amazonas Basin places the Brazilian Government in a contradictory position in relation to the NDC agreed in 2023, with threats of setback at COP30. In this sense, due to the power relations and the appealing political discourse without evidence of job creation and income for the local population, the activity may be licensed without a backup of environmental and social guarantees, with the aggravating factor of non-compliance with constitutional principles and environmental (Law 6.938/81) and climate (Law 12.187/09) policies, mainly regarding precaution and avoiding environmental setbacks.

The goal of decarbonizing the planet through the progressive elimination of fossil fuels approved at COP30 (and in the case of the Brazilian government, zero deforestation of the Amazon rainforest by 2030) will return to the agenda at the next COPs. This creates uncertainty about the Paris Agreement regarding the responses expected considering the increase in global temperature and the decrease in rainfall in the Amazon, resulting in droughts and drying up of rivers, forest fires, and climate tragedies announced in IPCC scenarios.

In addition to the lessons learned from the Yasuní-ITT Initiative and the PPG7, the Amazon COP30 must open space to become a more inclusive and timely formative pedagogical process for the launch of the Amazon Climate Initiative. However, this proposal will only make sense if it is led by society and based on the ethics of nature and the principles of environmental and climate justice.

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